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Comment on “Groove is in the Hart”:
A Workable Solution for Applying the
Right of Publicity to Video Games
Christopher B. Seaman*
The right of publicity is increasingly important to the
multibillion-dollar video game industry.1 In particular, many
sports-related video games, including Electronics Arts’ popular
NCAA® Football and NCAA® Basketball franchises, incorporate
the likenesses and personas of professional and amateur athletes
as an integral part of gameplay.
Not surprisingly, some athletes depicted in these games have
demanded compensation for the commercial exploitation of their
likenesses and personas.2 However, their claims are in tension
with the First Amendment,3 which safeguards freedom of speech
and expression, including expressions that implicate the right of
publicity.4 Federal and state courts have split regarding how to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of
Law. I thank Mr. Rice and the Editorial Board of the Washington and Lee Law
Review for inviting me to participate in the 2014 Washington and Lee Law
Review Notes Colloquium and for the efforts of the Law Review’s Editorial
Board and Staffwriters in preparing my Comment for publication.
1. See ENTM’T SOFTWARE ASS’N, 2014 ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE
COMPUTER AND VIDEO GAME INDUSTRY 13 (2014), http://www.theesa.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/ESA_EF_2014.pdf (stating that over $15 billion was
spent on video game content in the United States in 2013).
2. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724
F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that a video game developer’s use of
athlete’s likeness in video games was not entitled to a First Amendment defense
as a matter of law); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 146–47, 170 (3d Cir.
2013) (holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in
defendants’ favor in a lawsuit instituted on behalf of college athletes who
alleged violations of their right of publicity by appropriation of their likeness in
college football video games).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First
Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 67 (1994)
(discussing the “inherent conflict between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment”); Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the
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resolve this tension, adopting a variety of judicially created tests
that legal scholars have criticized as creating “massive
confusion”5 and uncertainty about the scope of First Amendment
protection.6
In his Note “Groove is in the Hart”: A Workable Solution for
Applying the Right of Publicity to Video Games,7 Garrett Rice
seeks to address this important issue by proposing a new
approach, which he labels the “readily identifiable” standard.8 I
believe that Mr. Rice’s well-researched and clearly written Note
makes a valuable contribution in the ongoing debate on how to
balance appropriately these competing interests in the video
game context. I am grateful to have the opportunity to participate
in a scholarly dialogue regarding his Note.
The recognition of a property right in one’s name, likeness,
and persona is a relatively recent development in American law.9
The right of publicity grew out of the common law right to
privacy,10 but it was only first recognized as an independent
cause of action in 1953.11 In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1590 (1979) (“The
First Amendment inevitably defines the operation and extent of the right of
publicity . . . .”).
5. Kwall, supra note 4, at 48; see also Gloria Franke, Note, The Right of
Publicity vs. the First Amendment: Will One Test Ever Capture the Starring
Role?, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 965 (2006) (arguing that there is a “lack of a
principled and consistent method of resolving the conflict between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS.
L. REV. 903, 916–92 (2003); see also Jordan M. Blanke, No Doubt About It—
You’ve Got to Have Hart: Simulation Video Games May Redefine the Balance
Between and Among the Right of Publicity, the First Amendment, and Copyright
Law, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 26, 63 (2013) (explaining that “[e]ven when
courts apply the same test to the same facts, results are inconsistent”).
7. R. Garrett Rice, Note, “Groove is in the Hart”: A Workable Solution for
Applying the Right of Publicity to Video Games, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 317
(2015).
8. Id. Part V.
9. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003)
(“The right of publicity is an intellectual property right of recent origin . . . .”).
10. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:2 (2d
ed. 2014).
11. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868
(2d Cir. 1953) (determining that professional baseball players had “the right to
grant the exclusive privilege of publishing [their] picture[s]”).
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Chewing Gum, Inc., the parties were rival chewing gum sellers
who sought to obtain rights from professional baseball players to
use their pictures on baseball cards.12 The plaintiff, Haelan,
negotiated exclusive licenses with a number of baseball players,
but the defendant, Topps, included pictures of some of the same
players in its own baseball cards.13 The Second Circuit held that
New York’s privacy law did not cover such uses.14 However, the
court recognized “that, in additional to and independent of that
right of privacy . . . , a man has a right in the publicity value of
his photograph the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture,”
which it termed “a right of publicity.”15 Today, a majority of states
recognize the right of publicity as a separate cause of action,
either under common law or by statute.16
The essence of a property right is the ability to exclude
others.17 However, the property right embodied in the right of
publicity is circumscribed by the First Amendment, which
protects “the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public
interest and concern.”18 First Amendment protection is
particularly robust for expression about celebrities and other
public figures.19 And “[b]ecause celebrities take on public
meaning, the appropriation of their likenesses may have
12. Id. at 867.
13. Id. at 868.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at § 6:3; Rice, supra note 7, at 330–32.
17. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing
the “right to exclude others” as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property”); see also Thomas W.
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998)
(arguing that “the right to exclude others is more than just one of the most
essential constituents of property—it is the sine qua non”); Adam Mossoff, What
Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 389 (2003)
(“[T]he right to exclude is a necessary characteristic of the concept of property.”).
18. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
19. See id. at 51 (“The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the
First Amendment is bound to produce speck that is critical of . . . public figures
who are intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or,
by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society . . . .”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Baumgartner v. United States, 322
U.S. 665, 673–74 (1944) (“One of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the
right to criticize public men and measures . . . .”).
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important uses in uninhibited debate on public issues,
particularly debates about culture and value.”20 Thus, an
unfettered property interest in a person’s name, image, and
likeness would limit and impoverish the scope of expression about
public figures. At its extreme, as Professor Michael Madow has
explained, the right of publicity could facilitate private censorship
of popular culture.21
Mr. Rice’s Note addresses a contemporary variation of the
issue encountered in Haelan Laboratories—whether the depiction
of highly skilled athletes without their permission violates the
right of publicity. Of course, the relevant medium is different; at
issue here is a digital, interactive version of the athletes’ likeness
in a video game rather than an “analog” still photograph on a
baseball card. But the bottom line question—what limits does the
First Amendment impose on the rights of individuals to control
their image and likeness in a commercial context—remains the
same. And the potential impact of this issue is economically
significant; the U.S. video game market is estimated to be over
$20 billion annually,22 greater than the domestic box office23 and
the music industry combined.24
In the more than sixty years since the Second Circuit first
recognized a right to publicity, courts have yet to definitively
determine the proper standard to balance the scope of this right
20. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal.
2001).
21. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture
and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 138 (1993); see also Comedy III
Prods., 21 P.3d at 803 (“[T]he very importance of celebrities in society means
that the right of publicity has the potential of censoring significant expression
by suppressing alternative versions of celebrity images that are iconoclastic,
irreverent, or otherwise attempt to redefine the celebrity’s meaning.”).
22. See ENTM’T SOFTWARE ASS’N, supra note 1, at 13.
23. See Yearly Box Office, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://boxoffice
mojo.com/yearly (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (showing total domestic gross movie
tickets sales of $10.4 billion for 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
24. See Randy Lewis, Music Industry Revenue in 2013 Stayed Flat at $7
Billion, RIAA Says, L.A. TIMES, (Mar. 18, 2014, 12:32 PM), http://
www.latimes.com/entertainment/music/posts/la-et-ms-music-industry-revenueriaa-report-streaming-digital-20140318-story.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2015)
(stating that overall revenue in the U.S. for the music industry was $7 billion in
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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against the guarantees enshrined in the First Amendment. This
is not entirely surprising. As the California Supreme Court has
recognized, “it is not a simple matter to develop a test that will
unerringly distinguish between forms of artistic expression
protected by the First Amendment and those that must give way
to the right of publicity.”25
In his Note, Mr. Rice identifies and explains the three most
prominent tests articulated to date—the Rogers test,26 the
transformative use test,27 and the predominant use test28—and
finds all of them wanting.29 As a new alternative,30 he proposes a
“readily identifiable” standard for resolving the conflict between
the right to publicity and the First Amendment in the realm of
video games, which is described as follows: “A video game violates
an individual right of publicity if a person familiar with the
individual would look at a video game character and know
immediately that the character is definitively based on the real
individual.”31 Conversely, if the individual depicted is not
immediately and definitely identifiable, then the representation
is deserving of First Amendment protection.32
Mr. Rice’s proposed “readily identifiable” standard has
several apparent benefits. First, the standard appears
25. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 807.
26. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1003–04 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The
common law right of publicity . . . grants celebrities an exclusive right to control
the commercial value of their names and to prevent others from exploiting them
without permission.”).
27. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808
(Cal. 2001) (holding than an “inquiry into whether a work is ‘transformative’
appears to us to be necessarily at the heart of any judicial attempt to square the
right of publicity with the First Amendment).
28. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)
(holding that a “predominant use test” should be employed to determine
whether the exploitation of a person’s identity violates that person’s right of
publicity).
29. Rice, supra note 7, at 333–34, 337–39, 340–42.
30. According to Mr. Rice, this test is based in part on Judge Alarcon’s
dissent in White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1404 (9th
Cir. 1992) (contending that “[i]t is patently clear to anyone viewing the
commercial advertisement that [plaintiff] was not being depicted”). Rice, supra
note 7, at 367.
31. Rice, supra note 7, at 366.
32. Id.
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straightforward and easy to administer. By articulating a clear
rule as to when the right of publicity is implicated, the parties
know what conduct transgresses the rule and can order their
affairs, including the licensing of that right, accordingly.33
Second, the standard avoids an overbreadth problem by
narrowly construing the scope of the right to publicity, requiring
that the digital representation is both “immediately” recognizable
and “definitively based on the real individual.”34 This would avoid
liability for highly transformative representations, such as the
depiction of a robot with blond hair acting as a game show
hostess, which the Ninth Circuit found implicated plaintiff Vanna
White’s right of publicity.35
Third, the standard takes a holistic view of the allegedly
improper representation, considering not only the digital likeness
of the person allegedly depicted but also the setting and other
relevant information (including sounds, biographical information,
and other unique characteristics).36 This will help avoid
situations where video game manufacturers strongly suggest an
individual by using personally identifiable information (such as a
collegiate player’s school, year(s) of enrollment, and jersey
number), but evade liability by making minor changes to the
digital representation of the individual’s image and likeness.
I also have several areas of potential concern regarding Mr.
Rice’s proposed standard. First, the “readily identifiable”
33. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
722, 730 (2002) (“[All property right] boundaries should be clear.”); Stewart E.
Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights,
106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2008) (“Clarity can be a considerable virtue in
property rights.”); J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43
UCLA L. REV. 711, 742 (1996) (“The right to property is the right to determine
the use or disposition of an alienable thing . . . and includes the right
to . . . license it to others (either exclusively or not) . . . .”).
34. Rice, supra note 7, at 366.
35. See White, 971 F.2d at 1399 (reversing the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in defendants’ favor on Ms. White’s right of publicity claim
regarding the depiction of a “female-shaped robot . . . wearing a long gown,
blond wig, and large jewelry” that “is in the process of turning a block letter on a
game-board” in defendants’ advertisement); see also White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (contending that the panel majority’s decision that
Ms. White’s right of publicity was implicated by defendants’ advertisement was
“a classic case of overprotection”).
36. Rice, supra note 7, at 368–70.
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standard is platform dependent; as the Note explains, the test
“appl[ies] specifically to the video game context.”37 But platformneutral tests have been effectively used to balance property and
First Amendment rights in other areas of the law, most notably
copyright. In copyright, the fair use defense “balances expressive
freedoms by permitting one to use another’s copyright expression
under certain circumstances.”38 The fair use inquiry, which turns
on four broad, nonexclusive factors,39 has been applied to permit
expressive speech across variety of platforms, including recording
and subsequent playback (time shifting) of television programs;40
reverse engineering and copying of software to achieve
interoperability on multiple consoles;41 altering the visual display
and game play of video games;42 and copying, searching, and
display of images by Internet search engines.43 Although
sometimes criticized for its unpredictability,44 the fair use defense
has proven a crucial bulwark against overbroad assertions of
copyright rights that impinge on First Amendment interests. One
potential downside of a context-specific test like the “readily
identifiable” standard is that it could not rely on analogous
rulings involving other media platforms.

37. Id. Part V.A.
38. Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2007).
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (listing as relevant factors “(1) the purpose
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature
or is for nonprofit educational purposes;” “(2) the nature of the copyrighted
work;” “(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole;” and “(4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work”).
40. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
41. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
42. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir.
1992).
43. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2002).
44. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187
(2004) (characterizing fair use as “the right to hire a lawyer”); David Nimmer,
“Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 263, 280 (2003) (noting the “malleability” of fair use factors). But see
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2541
(2009) (arguing that “fair use law is both more coherent and more predictable
than many commentators have perceived”).
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A second issue is the relevant audience for application of the
“readily identifiable” standard. As Professors Mark Lemley and
Jeanne Fromer have recently explained, the relevant audience “is
critical to understanding how [intellectual property] regimes
define infringement.”45 Under the “readily identifiable” standard,
identification is gauged from the perspective of “a person familiar
with the individual.”46 But such an audience might result in
overbroad protection because it depends on someone who already
knows the plaintiff and thus who would be more capable of
“immediately” and “definitively” identifying him or her. For
instance, the only people likely to be familiar with the backup
punter for a team depicted in the NCAA® Football game are the
punter’s family, friends, and teammates—a very limited
“audience” for purposes of measuring the right to publicity. Other
areas of intellectual property law, such as copyright and
trademark, assess the question of infringement from the
viewpoint of an ordinary person who consumes the product in
question.47 This difference may be outcome determinative; the
average 19-year-old playing NCAA® Football may recognize Sam
Keller or Ryan Hart, the former quarterbacks for Arizona State
and Rutgers, respectively, and plaintiffs in right-to-publicity
litigation, but he or she almost certainly will not be familiar with
the backup punter (if one exists) for these schools.48

45. Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual
Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2014).
46. Rice, supra note 7, at 366.
47. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (explaining
infringement is judged from “the response of the ordinary lay hearer”); Dawson
v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining that in
determining infringement, “a district court must consider the nature of the
intended audience of the plaintiff’s work. If, as will most often be the case, the
lay public fairly represents the intended audience, the court should apply
the . . . ordinary observer test”); Fromer & Lemley, supra note 45, at 1258–59 (in
trademark law, “the law focuses on consumers . . . as its audience for
infringement”).
48. In contrast, one advantage of using the perspective of audience familiar
with the person in question is that it may afford protection for “niche” celebrities
with a geographically or topically limited audience—e.g., an anchor on local
evening TV news show, or a prominent Jai Alai player—whereas an ordinary
consumer standard would not. See Rice, supra note 7, at 366–67 (discussing the
benefits of a “readily identifiable” standard).
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The final, and perhaps most significant, issue with the
“readily identifiable” standard is that the mere accurate depiction
of an individual’s image or likeness in a video game would
automatically create liability, even if the depiction is used in an
expressive, transformative, or noncommercial contest. For
instance, a parody of a person in a video game would appear to
violate the “readily identifiable” standard if the parody’s target
was readily identifiable. As the Supreme Court has explained, a
“parody must be able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of th[e]
original [target] to make the object of its critical wit
recognizable.”49 Indeed, if the target of a parody was not
identifiable, then the parody would be ineffective.50 But a rule
that creates liability for parodies in most cases would raise
serious constitutional concerns, as parody is generally protected
by the First Amendment.51 To avoid this problem, I suggest that
the “readily identifiable” test is better conceived of as the first
part of a two-part test. If the plaintiff in a right of publicity claim
is readily identifiable, then courts should ask whether the
defendant has used the plaintiff’s image or likeness in a way that
is primary expressive, transformative, or noncommercial. If so,
then no liability should attach.
In sum, despite these critiques, Mr. Rice’s Note is an
excellent piece of student scholarship—it is clearly written, well
organized, and makes a valuable contribution to the resolution of
a difficult problem that has perplexed courts and scholars alike
for decades. If legal scholarship is evaluated based on whether
“readers can find something professionally valuable in it,” as one
of my distinguished colleagues has suggested,52 then Mr. Rice has
certainly risen to the challenge with his Note.

49. Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994).
50. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d
252, 260 (4th Cir. 2007) (“A parody must convey two simultaneous—and
contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the
original and instead is a parody.” (citation omitted)).
51. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir.
1994) (“Parody does implicate the First Amendment’s protection of artistic
expression.”).
52. Sarah K. Wiant, Comment: 3D Printing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699,
705 (2014).

